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ESSAYS
FORECLOSURE OF A DEED OF TRUST IN VIRGINIA
Doug Rendleman *
This article deals with foreclosure of a deed of trust in Virginia.
The Introduction discusses the deed of trust or mortgage as a so-
cial and political institution and the foreclosure crisis that seems
to be ending. Part I is a brief history of mortgage law. It provides
a short history of the modern mortgage system in the United
States. Part II follows with a description of the approach that
Virginia takes to mortgages. It localizes the mortgage institution
to Virginia and introduces Virginia's vocabulary and technical de-
tails, the deed of trust, and the parties' rights and obligations.
Part III provides the procedures required to foreclose in Virginia
and sell the property used to secure the debt in the event of mort-
gage default. It develops the debtor's default, the creditor's fore-
closure, and the sale. Part IV outlines the potential responses and
defenses that a borrower may use when facing foreclosure after
default. It includes the borrower's defenses, redemption, tech-
niques to assert a defense, the "show-me-the-note" response, the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, federal bankruptcy, and self-
help and civil disobedience. The ideas for change in Part V offer
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suggestions for reforming the Virginia mortgage system to better
protect borrowers, while maintaining the efficiency of the foreclo-
sure process.
INTRODUCTION
Home ownership is a cornerstone of success in America. People
seek a stable job, a great marriage, 2.5 kids, and a brick house
with a white picket fence. Those who don't have that life, dream
of it. That is why it is called "The American Dream."
Home ownership is a sign of stability and community. An own-
er has the opportunity to accumulate wealth in the form of equity.
The mortgage market is inseparably commingled with the overall
well-being of the national economy.' The state of the housing
market is simultaneously an indicator of and a contributor to the
health of the economy.2 When foreclosures rise to unhealthy lev-
els, it hinders the recovery of the economy as a whole.3
The housing market is important to the American economy, so
public policy subsidizes home ownership. Tax benefits include de-
ducting mortgage interest and sheltering capital gains.4 A home-
owner has an exemption that may save all or a portion of her
home from her creditors, except the one that loaned her purchase
money.5
But home ownership, once achieved, is not always as pictur-
esque as expected. This article deals with what happens when the
owner's dream becomes a nightmare. In the early 2000s, the
American economy experienced a housing boom that led to an in-
evitable crash.6 An emotional commitment to the dream of owning
their own homes coupled with unscrupulous creditors and inves-
tors led many borrowers into improvident decisions to undertake
unsuitable mortgage debts. The market "bubble" burst between
2006 and 2007. The bonds that were based on these improvident
1. Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the
Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 455, 463-65 (2012).
2. Id. at 463.
3. Id. at 465.
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
6. Jed Kolko, What to Expect From the Housing Market in 2015, TIME (Dec. 29,
2014), http://time.com/money/3629800/housing-outlook-2015/; see also Williams, supra
note 1, at 463.
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mortgages depreciated rapidly and brought the economy almost
to its knees.
A foreclosure crisis began, which led to millions of foreclosures.
There were an estimated 2.5 million foreclosures between 2007
and 2009.7 Between 2008 and 2014, about 4.9 million foreclosures
were completed.8 However in 2014, there were 48,000 foreclo-
sures in January 2014 alone and 1.9 million homeowners' mort-
gages were in serious delinquency.9 Although projections predict
that the housing market will continue to improve, the American
economy hasn't fully recovered. Unless measures are taken to
correct the underlying issues, a future crash is possible."° Accord-
ing to Realthtrac.com, in 2015, foreclosure filings on 1,083,572
properties dropped to a nine-year low. Foreclosures were down
nationally in the first quarter of 2016, although Virginia foreclo-
sures were up. With nearly a million properties in some stage of
foreclosure, default, auction or bank owned, cleanup from the cri-
sis continues.
A number of factors contributed to the housing market crash.
Abuses included naive and unsophisticated buyer-borrowers;"
brokers whose profits were decoupled from any responsibility for
the future of the loans;2 lax underwriting standards;'3 subprime
mortgages;4 relaxed and inadequate documentation and back-
ground checks; reduction or elimination of down payments; ex-
tended terms; lender-placed second mortgages; adjustable-rate
mortgages that adjusted up; balloon payments; loan servicers
able to profit more from foreclosure than from modifying the
loans; and refinancing that reduced borrowers' equity. Exacerbat-
ing the moral hazard, the originators bundled the mortgages into
securities that were sold to investors.'5 The mortgages were based
7. Williams, supra note 1, at 456.
8. CORELOGIC, NATIONAL FORECLOSURE REPORT 2 (Jan. 2014), http://www.corelogic.
com/research/foreclosure-report/national-foreclosure-report-january-2014.pdf.
9. Id.
10. See Kolko, supra note 6.
11. See Williams, supra note 1, at 459.
12. See id.
13. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ABILiTY-TO-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE
RULE 9 (Nov. 3, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f201411_cfpbatr-qmsmall-ent
ity-compliance-guide.pdf; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 459.
14. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 9; Williams, supra note 1, at
463.
15. John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/55.
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on assumptions of continuing price appreciation." When appreci-
ation turned into depreciation, many of the new home owners'
dreams became nightmares. They found themselves with nega-
tive equity, or "under water," owing more on their loans than
their houses were worth.7 For many buyer-borrowers, home own-
ership was short and, in retrospect, unwise because foreclosure
followed default. Credit ratings were shattered.
Complaints poured in from consumers. The Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") opened a consumer complaint
website in a public database to document the problems that con-
sumers had with lenders.8 Since opening the complaint hotline,
the CFPB has received over 627,000 complaints, 28 percent of
which relate to mortgages, representing the largest percentage of
the complaints received.9 Among the many complaints, consum-
ers have focused on the difficulty in contacting lenders, citing ig-
nored calls, call redirection, and unsympathetic staff.2" Consum-
ers seeking loan modification were met with delay, obfuscation,
difficulty, and the threat of foreclosure.2
Increased disclosure, verification, and consumer education
might have preventive future effects. Subprime lenders and the
errant segments of the mortgage industry are being brought to
book. In 2012, for example, the United States government and
states' attorneys general entered a $26 billion settlement with
five large banks over problems in mortgage servicing.22 In April
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Kenneth R. Harney, Complaints Pour in to Consumer Financial Protection Bu-




20. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 457.
21. Harney, supra note 18.
22. Christopher K. Odinet, Banks, Break-ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1155, 1173-74 (2015). Under the terms of the settlement, mortgage ser-
vicers provided $5 billion to states for housing counseling and relief to those who lost their
homes and $20 billion in direct relief to borrowers. Danielle Douglas, Big Banks Finish
Paying $20 Billion in Mortgage Settlement, Report Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014),
[hereinafter Douglas, Big Banks] https://www.washingtonpost.combusiness/economy/big-
banks-finish-paying-20-billion-in-mortgage-settement-report-says/2014/03/18/32062d92-
aded-1le3-96dc-d6ea14c099f9_story.html. Servicers reduced principal balances on prima-
ry mortgages to the tune of $7.5 billion and refinanced the mortgages of struggling home-
owners to provide $3.5 billion of relief. Id. The settlement also bars dual-tracking and re-
quires banks to provide borrowers with a single point of contact so they are not routed to
different employees for each interaction. Id.
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2016, Goldman Sachs agreed to pay $5.06 billion to settle the
government's allegations that it had sold shoddy mortgages be-
fore the financial crisis, which brought the total of related settle-
ments to a nearly $40 billion." The problems included robo-
signing, sewer service, inadequate and unresponsive staffing, du-
al-tracking (foreclosing simultaneously with negotiation), inade-
quate mortgage and note documentation, and violation of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.24 Under the settlement, more
than half a million homeowners, including 5790 Virginians, re-
ceived loan modifications, short sales, refinancing, and forbear-
ance." Extrapolating from JPMorgan Chase's $13 billion settle-
ment, financial institutions expect their payouts to be around
another $50 billion. Consumers could take $15 billion in the form
of reduced payments and cash from these payouts.26
In early 2014, six years after foreclosure spun out of control,
new rules promulgated by the CFPB went into effect.27 The Bu-
reau's goal was to preserve most borrowers' access to mortgage
credit while ending unsustainable lending. For a qualified mort-
gage, these rules require all lenders to take steps that responsible
23. Renae Merle, Goldman Sachs Pays $5 Billion to Settle Allegations It Sold Shoddy
Mortgages, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/newsfbusiness/
wp2016/04/1 1/goldman-sachs-pays-5-billion-to-settle-allegations-it-sold-shoddy-mortgages-
prior-to-financial-crisis/; Matthew Goldstein, Goldman to Pay Up to $5 Billion to Settle
Claims of Faulty Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/
15/business/dealbooklgoldman-to-pay-5-billion-to-settle-claims-of-faulty-mortgages.html?-
r=0.
24. See Douglas, Big Banks, supra note 22; Reed Karaim, Mortgage Servicers Are Still
Wrecking Lives, INTEREST.COM (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.interest.com/mortgage/news/mo
rtgage-servicers-still-wrecking-lives/; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB
Supervision Report Highlights Mortgage Servicing Problems in 2013 (Jan. 30, 2014), http:
//www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-supervision-report-highlights-mortga
ge-servicing-problems-in-2013/; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Service Members to Re-
ceive Over $123 Million for Unlawful Foreclosures Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief
Act (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/service-members-receive-over-123-milli
on-unlawful-foreclosures-under-servicemembers-civil
25. JOHN RAO ET AL., FORECLOSURES: MORTGAGE SERVICING, MORTGAGE
MODIFICATIONS, AND FORECLOSURE DEFENSE § 2.9 (4th ed. 2012); Danielle Douglas, Banks
Make Progress on $25 Billion Mortgage Settlement, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter Douglas, Mortgage Settlement], http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
banks-make-progress-on-25-billion-mortgage-settlement/2013/02121/eO6eeed6-7c35-1 1e2-
a044-676856536b40_story.html.
26. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, Wall Street Predicts $50 Billion Bill to
Settle U.S. Mortgage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2014, at Al.
27. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1 (2016); Danielle Douglas, New Mortgage Rules Aim to Protect
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lenders should have taken all along-verify applicants' income,
assets, and debt.28 The CFPB provides eight specific factors that
represent he minimum standards that must be met to determine
if consumers have the ability to repay the amount lent to them.29
These eight underwriting factors include reasonably expected in-
come or assets, employment status, monthly mortgage payment,
other loan payments on the same property, payments for property
taxes, other debts, debt-to-income ratio, and consumer credit his-
tory.30 In August 2016, the CFPB issued updated servicing rules
to protect mortgage borrowers, which will become effective in
twelve months."'
Under the new rules, a mortgage servicer must be more trans-
parent with borrowers. Again, these are steps that responsible
businesses have taken all along-maintaining accurate records;
allowing a borrower access to staff; answering the phone; provid-
ing accurate information; and negotiating meaningfully to devel-
op options like reduced interest and lower payments for a borrow-
er in default to avoid foreclosure.32 Additionally, the CFPB
requires that lenders provide disclosures to borrowers and to
make attempts to work with borrowers to discuss loss mitigation
options .3
Lenders have imposed tighter lending restrictions and require
higher down payments. The twilight of the foreclosure crisis is a
propitious time take stock on what we have learned and to sug-
gest changes to ameliorate the hardships and reduce the risk of
another crisis.
28. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c) (2016); Douglas, New Mortgage Rules, supra note 27, at
A12.
29. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 9-10.
30. Id. at 17-18.
31. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau Expands Foreclosure Protections (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ab
out-uslnewsroomlconsumer-financial-protection-bureau-expands-forecosure-protections/.
32. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30-.32 (2015).
33. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, TILA-RESPA INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE RULE 12-
13 (July 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_cfpb-tila-respa-integrated-disclo
sure-rule.pdf; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURES ACT (REGULATION X) AND TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z) MORTGAGE
SERVICING FINAL RULES 12 (Nov. 3, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cf
pb-small-entity-compliance-guide-tila-respa.pdf.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MORTGAGES
The mortgage is an ancient institution. Its history winds back
to ancient Roman law. The modern American mortgage finds its
roots in the English common law.34 In early English law, mort-
gages took the form of a fee simple conveyance with a condition
subsequent." In essence, the borrower would convey the property
used to secure the loan to the lender with a condition that the
borrower could reenter when the loan amount was paid in full,
thus terminating the lender's estate.36 The right of reentry later
gave way to a covenant that the lender would reconvey legal title
in the land when the mortgage was paid off.37 In this early
scheme, the lender could not charge interest on the loan, but in-
stead looked to the income from the land for profit.3" The borrower
had until the "law day," the day that payment was due, to pay off
the mortgage before the borrower's right to reentry terminated.39
This early mortgage heavily favored the lender. Chancery
stepped in to right the balance." The Medieval Court of Chancery
developed the equity of redemption, a buyer's right to redeem his
property even after the law day had passed.4 Originally, a bor-
rower could defend his property even after default on the grounds
of "fraud, accident, misrepresentation, or duress."3 Soon this eq-
uitable right became available to all borrowers after default, even
in the absence of a defense.3 If a borrower was able to pay off the
remaining balance of the mortgage within a reasonable time after
default, the property securing the mortgage would be redeemed."4
Chancery recognized the potential for the borrower's equity of re-
34. See also GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 6 (6th ed. 2015); 1
GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES: DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS TO
LAND 2 (1943). Garrard Glenn was a beloved professor of law at the UVA law school from
1929-49 and somewhat of a character: readers may be interested in Professor Hamilton
Bryson's capsule biography, W. HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-
1979: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH 241 (1982).
35. GLENN, supra note 34, at 6; NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.
36. Id.
37. NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 6.
38. GLENN, supra note 34, at 5; NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 6.
39. GLENN, supra note 34, at 7; NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 6.
40. GLENN, supra note 34, at 11; NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 6.
41. GLENN, supra note 34, at 11; NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 6-7.
42. NELSON ETAL., supra note 34, at 6.
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id.
2016]
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demption to be used at the expense of the lender, who could be
left indefinitely waiting for the borrower to redeem his land.4"
Thus, the equity of redemption came hand-in-hand with the lend-
er's right to foreclose, to terminate the borrower's equity of re-
demption and unite the legal and equitable interest in the lend-
er.
46
The United States built its own mortgage practices on the
English-law foundation. Under American law, a mortgage trans-
action has two distinct instruments: the note and the mortgage.
The note represents the borrower's contractual obligation to re-
pay her debt to the lender. The mortgage instrument provides a
property as collateral to secure the loan obligation. Modern mort-
gages are outlined in statutes and supported by judicial decisions.
Enforcement of a lien is equitable, providing the judge with equi-
table discretion.47
Building from English law, the 1930s led to the end of the law
day and the modern mortgage. Before this time, the structure of
mortgages was short-term, with borrowers paying interest while
48saving up to pay off the principal balance by the loan's due date.
The Federal Housing Administration led the charge to amortize
mortgages, leading to borrowers paying off both interest and
principal over a longer period.9
The vast majority of mortgage law fell to the states, leading to
mortgage variations among American jurisdictions." The prevail-
ing theories of mortgages in the states are the title and lien theo-
ries.5 The title theory of mortgages is closely related to the Eng-
lish common law mortgage.52 Under this theory, the legal title of
the property belongs to the lender, giving it the right to posses-
45. GLENN, supra note 34, at 17; NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.
46. Id.
47. See generally David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773,
1844-68 (2013) (advocating broadened equitable defenses and discretion in mortgage fore-
closure); see, e.g., Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp'rs Ret. Tr. Fund v. Gal-
leria P'ship, 780 P.2d 608, 617 (Mont. 1989); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Meyers, 913
N.Y.S.2d 500, 503 (2010), rev'd on other grounds, 966 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112 (2013)
("[Floreclosure ... is equitable in nature and triggers" broad equitable powers.).
48. NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
49. Id.




FORECLOSURE OF A DEED
sion." Fewer than ten American jurisdictions continue to follow
this theory of mortgages."4 The majority of states follow the lien
theory, which does not vest the lender with title, but rather a se-
curity interest that leaves the right to possession with the buyer
until the land is foreclosed upon."
In addition to mortgage theories, states differ on the treatment
of foreclosure.56 Foreclosure in the United States is predominately
based on a public sale of the property, although some states ad-
here to strict foreclosure, where the land is forfeited without sale
to the lender.7 A majority of American jurisdictions allow for a
public sale following a judicial determination.58 A judicial foreclo-
sure allows all interested parties to be notified and appear in
court. 9 Other states allow for foreclosure by power of sale without
judicial intervention."0 Interested parties are notified following
the statutory procedure provided by the individual state.6
Another relevant state variation is the deed of trust. The deed
of trust is a mortgage instrument, in which the property used to
secure a loan is transferred to a third-party trustee to be held as
security for the lender.62 Upon default, the trustee is able to bring
foreclosure via power of sale on behalf of the lender."
Although real property is local in nature, the modern mortgage
in the United States has transcended state boundaries. A detailed
contemporary source is the National Consumer Law Center's
Foreclosures: Mortgage Servicing, Mortgage Modifications, and
Foreclosure Defense, which has a comprehensive companion web-
site." Loans are traded across state lines and bundled into securi-
ties. Lenders retain out-of-state companies to service their loans.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 128.
55. Id. at 9.






62. Id. at 10.
63. Id.
64. See generally RAO ET AL., supra note 25.
2016]
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On a practical level, if sued in a Virginia circuit court, out-of-state
creditors frequently remove the lawsuits to federal court.65
Although mortgage law typically falls to the states, the federal
government has stepped up its efforts to better protect debtors,
especially in the wake of the 2008 crash.6 Since the Great Reces-
sion, federal agencies and federal law regulate the loan transac-
tion. In addition to the CFPB, mentioned above, the Federal
Housing Administration ("FHA"), Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD"), Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation or Fannie Mae, and Freddy Mac appear in Virginia foreclo-
sures. Federal law includes the Truth in Lending Act, Home Af-
fordable Modification Program ("HAMP"), the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.67 Virginia courts apply
federal law, for example the FHA's prerequisite of a face-to-face
meeting before acceleration."
With this background in mind, the article turns to the present
state of mortgages in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
II. THE VIRGINIA APPROACH TO MORTGAGE LAW
Virginia has followed the majority of American jurisdictions in
adopting the lien theory of mortgages.69 In Virginia, the borrower
retains both the title to the property and right to possession until
65. E.g., Tapia v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 718 F. Supp. 2d 689, 694 (E.D. Va. 2010).
66. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 9.
67. Class actions contesting creditors' mass foreclosures are pending in early 2014
where the plaintiffs have survived defendants' motions to dismiss. First, allegations under
the HAMP of breach of the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Virginia Equal Cred-
it Opportunity Act, defamation, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Bourdelais v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA.,
No. 3:10cv670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158508, at *29 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2012); Bourdelais v.
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:10cv670, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35507, at *29 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 1, 2011). Second, breach of a fiduciary duty of impartiality and the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act. Goodrow v. Friedman & MacFadyen, P.A., No. 3:11cv20, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105395, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2013).
68. Squire v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507, 516-17, 758 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2014) (rul-
ing on a HUD face-to-face meeting); Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 283 Va. 723, 736, 724
S.E.2d 196, 202 (2012); Parris v. PNC Mortg., 2014 WL 3735531, at *5 (E.D. Va. 2014)
(explaining that extensive dealings are not an exception to prerequisite of face-to-face
meeting).
69. High Knob Assocs. v. Douglas, 249 Va. 478, 484 n.4, 457 S.E.2d 349, 352 n.4
(1995); GLENN, supra note 34, at 198.
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foreclosure." Additionally, Virginia has adopted the power-of-sale
foreclosure model. Because the property can be sold without judi-
cial intervention, the foreclosure process is more expeditious and
less costly than in judicial-foreclosure jurisdictions.7' Under a
power-of-sale foreclosure, the necessary procedures are notice,
advertisement, and sale, which will be discussed in detail below.
A. The Deed of Trust
When a borrower pledges real property to a lender to secure a
debt in Virginia, the borrower signs a note to personally guaran-
tee the loan, and a property conveyance to secure the debt. In
many states, the conveyance is called a mortgage; but Virginia
utilizes the deed of trust as the instrument used to secure a debt
with real property as collateral.72 Under this mortgage variation,
the borrower is called the trustor and conveys a security interest
in the property to the trustee, a disinterested third party, through
a lien.7 The trustor maintains both legal and equitable title in
the property, while the trustee acts as an agent-fiduciary of both
the trustor and the lender, who is the beneficiary of the trust.4
The deed of trust secures the lender-beneficiary's interest and
protects the borrower from acceleration and foreclosure before the
lender satisfies the conditions precedent it imposes.5 If the bor-
rower pays her debt to the lender, the lien on the property is re-
leased and the property is no longer encumbered.76 If, instead, the
borrower fails to pay, the trustee is able to foreclose upon and sell
the property at the request of the lender.77 The sale terminates
the borrower's interest in the property; title then vests in the
buyer at the public sale.6
70. Matson v. Grease Monkey Intl, Inc. (In re Beverage of Va., Inc.), 237 B.R. 311, 314
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).
71. NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 8, 634 n.459.
72. GLENN, supra note 34, at 122.
73. Id. at 122, 128, 137.
74. Franklin Plant Farm, Inc. v. Nash, 118 Va. 98, 111, 86 S.E. 836, 840 (1915); Mayo
v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 485, 496 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citing Whitlow v.
Mountain Trust Bank, 215 Va. 149, 152, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1974) (holding trustee is a
fiduciary for both borrower and lender with common-law duty of impartiality)); GLENN,
supra note 34, at 128-29.
75. Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 283 Va. 723, 732, 724 S.E.2d 196, 200 (2012).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.3 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
77. GLENN, supra note 34, at 124-25.
78. Id. at 127.
2016]
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Virginia law treats a deed of trust like a contract.79 This ena-
bles the parties to a deed of trust to contract to implement their
intent.s A court construes the deed of trust as it would any other
contract, "within the four corners of the instrument itself.""s The
deed of trust is outlined in the Virginia Code, which also provides
default rules that govern unless the deed contains provisions to
the contrary.82 In other words, the contract's duties, if more de-
tailed, outrank the statute's.3 For example, the means used to
advertise a foreclosure sale is set out in the Virginia Code; how-
ever, parties are free to provide their own means of advertise-
ment in the deed of trust."
As property may be encumbered by multiple liens, it is im-
portant to note how recording of a deed of trust affects priority of
creditors. Virginia's recording act is a race-notice statute.5 A deed
of trust need not be recorded to be effective among the parties.
However, an unrecorded deed will not establish a lien effective
against other creditors and subsequent purchasers from the bor-
rower without notice.86 The lender should record the deed of trust
in the clerk's office in the county or city where the property is lo-
cated to protect itself against future creditors and purchasers.7 In
the same vein, notes and deeds of trust are negotiable instru-
ments that are freely transferrable unless their terms provide
otherwise.8 A note and/or deed of trust assignment may be rec-
orded in the clerk's office, but failure to record an assignment
79. Mathews, 283 Va. at 733, 724 S.E.2d at 200; see also Squire v. Va. Hous. Dev., 287
Va. 507, 515, 758 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2014).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
81. Mathews, 283 Va. at 733, 724 S.E.2d at 201; see also VA. CODE. ANN. § 55-59 (Repl.
Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
82. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-58-59 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
83. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 275 Va. 114, 121, 654 S.E.2d 898,
901 (2008).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.2 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
85. Id. § 55-96 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
86. Hunton v. Wood, 101 Va. 54, 61, 43 S.E. 186, 188 (1903).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2016); see also Tyler v. Owhit Mortg.
Loan Tr., Series 2006-3, 460 B.R. 458, 462 (E.D. Va. 2011), affd 474 F. App'x 893 (4th Cir.
2012).
88. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1A-302(a), 8.3A-104 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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does not affect its enforceability.9 Courts have found that the bor-
rower is a nonparty to the assignment, and therefore lacks stand-
ing to challenge an assignment of the note. °
A specific type of deed of trust called a credit-line deed of trust
secures the lender's future advances to the borrower.91 To be en-
forceable, it must be clearly marked as a credit-line deed of
trust.92 Once recorded, a credit-line deed of trust establishes the
lender's priority against a subsequent creditor for any advances
given on or after the date of execution.93 However, a subsequent
judgment creditor may give notice to the holder of a credit-line
deed of trust to obtain priority for its judgment over future ad-
94vances.
B. Rights and Obligations of the Parties
Under the Virginia Code, the parties to a deed of trust (the
trustor, trustee, and beneficiary) have separate rights and obliga-
tions that will be detailed in turn below.
The trustor, or the borrower, retains the rights to possession
and ownership of the property used to secure the loan.95 However,
retaining possession of the property comes with obligations that
are outlined in Virginia Code. Unless the terms of the deed of
trust indicate otherwise, the Code imposes statutory duties upon
the trustor, which include duties to pay taxes, not to commit
waste, and to maintain improvements in habitable condition.96
Additionally, the statute provides that interest will accrue from
the date of sale, and that the deed of trust secures the interest as
89. Id. § 55-66.01 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
90. Wolf v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 512 F. App'x 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2013); Buzbee v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 84 Va. Cir. 485, 489 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2012) (Fairfax County).
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-58.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
92. Id. § 55-58.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016). 'The words 'this is a credit line deed of trust,'
or words of like purport, if in capital letters or underscored and on the first page of the
deed of trust and containing the name and address of the noteholder, shall have the mean-
ing set forth in § 55-58.2." Id. § 55-60(11) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
93. Id. § 55-58.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
94. Id. §§ 55-58.2(D), -96(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
95. Matson v. Grease Monkey Int'l, Inc. (In re Beverage of Va., Inc.), 237 B.R. 311, 314
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998); GLENN, supra note 34, at 128-29.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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well as the principal.9 7 In the event of default and foreclosure, the
borrower is entitled to any surplus from the sale of the land.98
The trustee is a fiduciary who owes duties to the other parties
to the deed of trust.9" The trustee has duties to remain impartial
and to act in the best interest of the parties." The trustee, who is
an agent-fiduciary of both the trustor and the beneficiary of the
trust, can be liable for breach of his fiduciary duty. 1 Absent
breach, however, the trustee is only liable to the beneficiary for
the profit realized from his duties under the trust; he is not liable
for failing to realize a profit at the sale."2
The Virginia Code also outlines the requirements for becoming
a trustee. First, only a resident of Virginia or a corporation with
its principal office in Virginia may serve as trustee under a deed
of trust.0 ' If the trustee does not meet this requirement, the court
may appoint another to conduct the sale."4 If the secured lender
is a corporation, the trustee may be a stockholder, member, em-
ployee, officer, director, or attorney for the corporation."5 A trus-
tee named in a deed of trust "where the deed or other writing re-
quires that the trustee qualify" must take an oath before the
circuit court or clerk that he will perform the duties of his office."6
If the trustee is a corporation or other entity, its president or oth-
er officer may take the oath."
7
After meeting the statutory requirements, the trustee holds the
security interest in trust until the underlying debt is paid or the
97. Id. § 55-59(8) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
98. GLENN, supra note 34, at 125.
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-100 (Repl. Vol. 2012); GLENN, supra note 34, at 125.
100. See Mayo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 485, 496 (E.D. Va. 2014); Whit-
low v. Mountain Tr. Bank, 215 Va. 149, 152, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1974). Trustee is a fidu-
ciary for both borrower and lender with common-law duty of impartiality. GLENN, supra
note 34, at 126.
101. See, e.g., Bremer v. Bitner, 44 Va. Cir. 505, 512-13 (1996) (Fairfax County).
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-794 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
103. Id. § 55-58.1(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012). The Attorney General has issued opinions stat-
ing that Virginia limited liability corporations and limited liability partnerships may serve
as trustees in deed of trust on real property. 2001 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 171, 172; Op. to Hon.
Gregory D. Habeeb (Mar. 23, 2012). It has also opined that the definition of principal office
in Title 13.1 applies to § 55-58. 1. Op. to Hon. J. Chapman Petersen (Sep. 14, 2012).
104. Somers v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 177 Va. 431, 441, 14 S.E.2d
327, 331 (1941) (finding the trustee was a foreign corporation not domesticated in Virginia
and had no agent or representative in Virginia).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1423(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
106, Id. § 64.2-1403(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
107. Id.
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borrower defaults.°8 In the event of default, the trustee has a du-
ty to foreclose upon the secured property."9 This must be done at
public auction, and the trustee must follow the statutory re-
quirements for advertising and notice, unless the deed of trust
provides for alternate measures."' Finally, after the sale is com-
plete, the trustee has the duty to account for the profits in the
manner outlined in the Virginia Code."' The procedures for fore-
closure and sale will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
In exchange for his services, a trustee is entitled to compensa-
tion.112 A trustee's compensation, if not specified in the deed of
trust, should be limited to what is "reasonable under the circum-
stances.""' 3 Even if the compensation is set in the deed of trust,
the court may alter the amount if the compensation contemplated
in the deed of trust is unreasonably high or low. The trustee is al-
so entitled to reimbursement of expenses."4 A trustee may forfeit
his right to compensation if he breaches his fiduciary duties owed
to the parties."5
The lender, as the beneficiary of the trust, has the right by
statute to appoint a substitute trustee for any reason, even if the
instrument does not expressly state as such, by executing an "in-
strument of appointment.""' Borrowers' attempts to attack ap-
pointments of substitute trustees before foreclosure have not suc-
ceeded. A borrower, courts have held, is not a party to the
appointment and lacks standing to contest it." '
108. Id. §§ 55-66.0-66.5 (Repl. Vol. 2012); GLENN, supra note 34, at 124-25.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59(7) (Repl. Vol. 2012); GLENN, supra note 34, at 125.
110. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59.1-59.2 (Repl. Vol. 2012); GLENN, supra note 34, at 125.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 2012); GLENN, supra note 34, at 125.
112. GLENN, supra note 34, at 136.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-761(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
114. Id. §§ 64.2-61-62 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
115. GLENN, supra note 34, at 136.
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59(9) (Repl. Vol. 2012). When the instrument is executed, the
power immediately vests with the substitute trustee named therein. The substitution in-
strument should be recorded in the clerk's office where the original deed of trust was rec-
orded.
117. Lewis v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 3:13cv00026, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11113,
at *2, *7-9 (W.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2014); Greene v. LNV Corp., No. 3:12cv780, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57182, at *1, *9-10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2013), aff'd No. 13-1660, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2630 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014); Wolf v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 512 F. App'x 336, 342
(4th Cir. 2013); Bennett v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. 3:12cv34-HEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
III. DEFAULT, FORECLOSURE, AND SALE
A. Default
The trustee's power to foreclose and sell the real estate arises
when the borrower defaults on her obligations under the deed of
trust. The Virginia Code provides that the borrower's failure to
pay under the deed of trust or breach of any other promise consti-
tutes default.'18 Unless the deed of trust provides to the contrary,
the borrower's failure to pay taxes, commission of waste, and fail-
ure to maintain habitability are also considered defaults."9
Unless the deed of trust expressly states otherwise, every deed
of trust is presumed to contain an acceleration provision: the
lender's ability to call the entire loan due at once if the borrower
defaults.20 Upon default, the trustee is able to accelerate the debt
the borrower owes on the mortgage, making the full payment due
at once. Unless the deed of trust states otherwise, a borrower's
single missed payment is a default and is sufficient cause to ac-
celerate.2' However, new CFPB rules require clear monthly
statements to borrowers and prohibit a mortgage servicer from
starting foreclosure until the borrower completes a loss-
mitigation statement and 120 days have passed since the borrow-
er's last payment.22
The borrower should receive a pre-acceleration notice or notice
of default giving her a thirty-day right to cure.22 The borrower's
default does not excuse the lender's duty to satisfy conditions
precedent to foreclosure.'24 The borrower's default in payments
doesn't discharge the lender's post-default obligations. The bor-
rower's nonpayment isn't a material breach.2' Even if the bor-
rower is in arrears, the lender must comply with all the condi-
54725, at *20 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2012).
118. Squire v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507, 521, 758 S.E.2d 55, 63 (2014) (decid-
ing whether a borrower in arrears breached the contract); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59(7) (Repl.
Vol. 2012).
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 2012); NELSON, supra note 34, at 540.
120. Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., 223 Va. 131, 138, 286 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1982).
121. E.g., In re Stokes, 39 B.R. 336, 339-40 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
122. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.41, 1024.41 (2016).
123. Harrison v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:12-cv-00224, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85735, at *2, *4-5 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2012).
124. Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 283 Va. 723, 733, 724 S.E.2d 196, 200 (2012).
125. Id. at 730, 724 S.E.2d at 199.
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tions before foreclosing.126 Borrowers have contested lenders' fail-
ure to provide proper pre-acceleration notice, for example, over-
stating the arrears.2 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the HUD face-to-face
meeting is a condition precedent o acceleration and foreclosure.'
2
This meeting could allow a borrower in default to negotiate to re-
solve the issues.' The absence of an ability to accelerate means
that the lender may either sue or foreclose for installments as
they become due, or wait until the amortization period ends to
collect the full obligation.
The typical acceleration clause gives the lender the right, upon
the borrower's default, to declare the entire obligation due and
payable immediately. The acceleration letter informs the borrow-
er of the right to cure. Acceleration is effective when, after de-
fault, the lender notifies the borrower. If the borrower defaults,
and if the lender requests, the trustee may call the entire balance
of the loan due and may take possession of the property and pro-
ceed to foreclosure sale.'
The deed of trust and its terms grant the trustee the power to
sell the mortgaged property in the event of a borrower's default.'
126. Bagley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11880,
at *12 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2013).
127. E.g., Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 275 Va. 114, 118, 654 S.E.2d 898,
899 (Va. 2008); see also Blaney v. Beneficial Fin. I, Inc., No. 7:13cv00333, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29224, at *3-4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2014); Vazzana v. Citimortgage, Inc., No.
7:12cv00497, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78541, at *4-5 (W.D. Va. June 4, 2013).
128. Squire v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507, 516, 758 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2014);
Mathews, 283 Va. at 736, 724 S.E.2d at 202. Parris v. PNC Mortg., 2014 WL 3735531, at
*5 (E.D. Va. 2014) (holding that extensive dealings are not an exception to prerequisite of
face-to-face meeting).
129. Squire, 287 Va. at 529, 758 S.E.2d at 67 (Mims, J., concurring); Bagley, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11880, at *13.
130. Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., 223 Va. 137, 138, 286 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1982). The
statute states that request must be made by the beneficiary of the deed of trust before the
trustee has authority to foreclose. Where the deed of trust repeats this requirement, Vir-
ginia courts have held that the request is a condition precedent to the trustee's right to
sell, and a sale made without such a request may be set aside. Wills v. Chesapeake W. Ry.
Co., 178 Va. 314, 321-22, 16 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1941). If there is a dispute as to the amount
owed and/or whether a default exists, the trustee must petition the court to settle that
question before proceeding to foreclose. Bremer v. Bitner, 44 Va. Cir. 505, 512 (1996) (Fair-
fax County) (citing Morriss v. Va. State Ins. Co., 90 Va. 370, 373, 18 S.E.2d 843, 844
(1893)).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-61 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Therefore, if the terms do not provide for a date of maturity, fore-
closure or sale, the secured creditor must petition the court for a
decree of sale.132
B. Foreclosure
The lender's remedies on the borrower's default are foreclosure
and sale. If the proceeds from the sale are not enough to satisfy
the debt, the lender may seek a money judgment for the deficien-
cy, a personal judgment on the borrower's obligation or note.3 '
The lender must fulfill its requirements in the deed of trust
provisions and the relevant statutes before the property may be
sold at foreclosure. The procedures for notice and advertisement
are precise. Although inadvertent failure to follow them properly
does not automatically render the sale void or subject the trustee
or the secured lender to liability, it may nevertheless defeat the
foreclosure or cause additional delay and expense."'
The Virginia Code provides a form for notice of sale.3 ' Notice
should also conform to the requirements of the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.13 In Virginia, the notice must include
the date, time, and place of the proposed sale, as well as either
the instrument number of the trustee's appointment or a copy of
the substitution of trustee.7 The Virginia Code provides that
such notice is also sufficient to exercise the trustee's acceleration
right contained in the deed of trust.'38 However, in 2008, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that section 55-59 does not super-
sede the terms of the deed of trust.3 9 Therefore, if the deed of
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Nizan v. Wells Fargo, 274 Va. 481, 486, 650 S.E.2d 497, 499 (2007); Reso-
lution Tr. Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 1276, 1280 (4th Cir. 1994).
134. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59.1(A), -59.1(C), -59.2(E) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
135. Id. § 55-62.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2012).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
138. Id.
139. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 275 Va. 114, 120-21, 654 S.E.2d 898,
901 (2008). If the deed of trust contains in its terms specific directions concerning notice of
sale, they are material and the trustee is required to comply with them. Tabet v. Good-
man, 136 Va. 526, 534, 118 S.E. 230, 232 (1923).
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trust provides that the trustee does not have the right to acceler-
ate until the pre-acceleration notice has been provided, failure to
provide such notice is not excused by section 55-59.14°
The trustee must send written notice of the foreclosure sale to
the current owner of the property at her last known address ac-
cording to the lender's records. The notice must either be sent by
certified or registered mail or personally delivered at least four-
teen days before the sale.14 ' If there are junior lien-holders and/or
assignees who hold notes secured by deeds of trust recorded at
least thirty days before the sale is scheduled to take place, writ-
ten notice must be sent to the addresses recorded on the deeds of
trust.14' Finally, if a condominium association, homeowner's asso-
ciation, or proprietary lessee's association has filed a lien that
was recorded at least thirty days prior to the date of sale, that as-
sociation must be notified.4
Notice to junior lien-holders, assignees, and associations may
be sent by regular mail at least fourteen days before the sale. Be-
cause of these requirements and the IRS notice requirements be-
low, it is imperative for the lender to perform a title examination
within thirty days before the date of sale in order to discover all
other lien-holders before the sale is carried out.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS should be notified of
a sale of property on which it holds a subordinate lien recorded
more than thirty days before the sale.14 The statute provides that
notice of the sale must be given "in writing, by registered or certi-
fied mail or by personal service, not less than 25 days prior to
such sale.'' If properly notified, the federal tax lien becomes a
140. Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 283 Va. 723, 731, 724 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2012);
Simmons, 275 Va. at 121-22, 654 S.E.2d at 901.
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012). Mailing the notice at least 14 days
before the sale satisfies the requirement, not actual, completed notice to the mortgagor.
Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 719 (W.D. Va. 2011); Sun Tr.
Bank v. Wright, 63 Va. Cir. 396, 397 (2003) (Roanoke City) (holding that notice sent to the
owner's address after her death and not to the executor nevertheless satisfied notice re-
quirements under § 55-59.1).
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
143. Id.
144. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (2012).
145. Id. § 7425(c). The notice should be sent to the IRS district office for the district
where the property is located. Id.
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right of redemption for the IRS that expires 120 days after the
foreclosure sale.
146
If proper notice is not given, that creditor's lien transfers, un-
disturbed, with the property to the successful bidder.'47 The suc-
cessful bidder is under no obligation to verify whether proper no-
tice was given to the former owner.'48 However, the trustee can
petition the IRS for its consent to the sale in order to accomplish
the same result as notice.
19
Notice is not required to be sent to a guarantor." Nor is there a
requirement that notice be sent to the borrower's tenants on the
property. However, because both guarantors and tenants are po-
tentially interested parties, it is good practice for the trustee or
the lender to notify them.
Once the notice has been sent as provided by statute, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the creditor-lien-holder has provided
notice of default in compliance with the terms of the deed of
trust."' If the trustee postpones the sale, the parties need not be
sent additional notice.
Before a foreclosure sale can take place, the trustee must also
advertise it in a newspaper that is circulated in the city or county
where the property is located.' The advertisement should con-
tain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, but the
description need not be as detailed as the description in the deed
of trust.'' The advertisement should also state the date, time,
and location of the sale; the sale terms, including any required
deposit, and whether the sale is subject to a prior deed of trust;
and the name of the trustee or substitute trustee.5 4 Finally, it
should contain contact information to reach someone who can an-
146. Id. § 7425(d). If the IRS wishes to redeem the property, the amount to be paid is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c) (2012).
147. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (2012).
148. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
149. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(c)(2) (2012).
150. Warner v. Clementson, 254 Va. 356, 361, 492 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1997).
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
152. Id. § 55-59.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
153. Id. § 55-59.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012). The property's street address may be used or, if
there is none, a general description of its location using landmarks and street names. The
tax map identification number may be provided, but is not required.
154. Id.
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swer questions about the property or sale.155 The trustee does not
need to advertise the amount due on the note.156
If required information is missing or incorrect in the first ad-
vertisement, but corrected in subsequent advertisements, case
law suggests that a resulting sale remains valid."7 Likewise, sub-
stantial compliance with advertising requirements may be suffi-
cient as long as the deficiencies at issue do not materially affect
the parties' rights.'
Where the deed of trust directs the trustee, in case of default,
to sell the realty in accordance with specified statutes, the meth-
od of advertisement should follow the statute in effect at the time
the deed of trust was executed. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the advertisement terms in the deed of trust should "be
measured and determined by the language of the statute which
was in effect at the date of the execution and delivery of the deed,
and not by that which was in effect at the time of the sale."' 9
Where the statute relating to advertisement of a trustee's sale
is referred to and incorporated in the deed of trust, its provisions
become material and determine the method of advertising.
60
If the deed of trust sets out requirements for advertisement
publication, then those requirements are all that is necessary as
long as they meet the minimum statutory standards.' They may
state that the foreclosure advertisement must be published at
least once a week for two weeks or, if published daily, for three
days which may be consecutive.'62 If the deed of trust does not
provide for advertisement by publication, then the trustee must
advertise once a week for four consecutive weeks or, if the proper-
ty is located in a city or in a county immediately contiguous to a
city, daily for five days which may be consecutive.63
155. Id. The statute specifies that the contact person's name, address, and phone num-
ber should be listed.
156. Ashworth v. Cole, 180 Va. 108, 114-15, 21 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1942).
157. Bailey v. Pioneer Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 210 Va. 558, 563, 172 S.E.2d 730, 734
(1970).
158. Id. at 562, 172 S.E.2d at 734.
159. Cromer v. De Jarnette, 188 Va. 680, 684, 51 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1949).
160. Gloucester Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182 Va. 869, 871, 30 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1944).
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.2(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 55-59.2(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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If the sale is postponed, the advertisement requirements above
must be completed anew, unlike the notice requirements. In
addition, the current statute states that failure to comply with
advertising requirements renders the sale voidable by the court.'
C. Sale
Once the advertisement requirements have been met, the sale
must be conducted between eight and thirty days after the last
publication.
16
Unless otherwise stated in the deed of trust, the foreclosure
sale should be conducted at the property being sold, at the court-
house steps, the front of the circuit court building of the city or
county where the property, "or the greater part" of the property is
located, or at another place within that city or county.167 The stat-
ute also states that the sale may take place "in the corporate lim-
its of any city surrounded by or contiguous to such county, or in
the case of annexed land, in the county of which the land was
formerly a part, as the trustee may select."'" If the trustee is fore-
closing upon a deed of trust that is junior to another deed of trust,
the trustee may sell the property "subject to" the prior deed of
trust or apply the proceeds of the sale to the payment of that obli-
gation.'69
The trustee's duty is to conduct the sale with a good faith effort
to obtain the best price.'7 The trustee should conduct the sale in
an impartial manner, because he is an agent-fiduciary of both the
borrower-grantor and the lender-beneficiary of the deed of
trust. 7' He has no obligation or duty to bidders at the sale, "ex-
164. Id. § 55-59.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
165. Id. § 55-59.2(E) (Repl. Vol. 2012). In 1988, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that foreclosure sales wore void, not voidable, if advertisements did not meet the require
ment. Deep v. Rose, 234 Va. 631, 637, 364 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1988). However, this was sub-
sequently superseded by statute in 1992. Substantial compliance with the statute will sat-
isfy the court and the sale will stand. Wood v. MorEquity, Inc., 331 F. App'x 243, 244-45
(4th Cir. 2009); Riley v. Robey, 25 F. App'x 149, 154 (4th Cir. 2002). For an example of an
advertioement which the court found sufficiently flawed to void the sale. Sce Lindocy v.
Olsen, 30 Va. Cir. 406, 407 (1993) (Fairfax County) (advertising the wrong address).
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.2(A)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
167. Id. § 55-59.7 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
168. Id.
169. Kaplin v. Ruffin, 213 Va. 551, 554-55, 193 S.E.2d 689, 692-93 (1973).
170. Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755, 759, 82 S.E. 711, 712 (1914); Hudson v. Bar-
ham, 101 Va. 63, 67, 43 S.E. 189, 190 (1903).
171. Linney v. Normoyle, 145 Va. 589, 593, 134 S.E. 554, 555 (1926). The trustee sold
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cept to refrain actively from doing anything to hamper them in
their search for information or to prevent the discovery of defects
by inspection."'72 Therefore, if he has reason to believe that post-
poning the sale to a later date will obviate a significantly lower
price than expected, he has the discretion, and possibly an obliga-
tion, to do so."' If the property will bring a better price by selling
it in separate lots or parcels and if the owner-borrower requests
this, and if the trustee refuses, then at the request of the owner,
the court may decree such a sale.74
Any person other than the trustee may bid on the property at
the sale.'7' The prohibition against trustee bidding is absolute: a
co-trustee who does not participate in conducting the sale may
not bid on or purchase the property.176 An improper purchase is
voidable, regardless of good faith, fair price, or whether the trus-
tee purchases the property for himself or on another party's be-
half.
1 7
In addition to oral bids in person, the trustee may accept writ-
ten one-price bids, which he should announce at the sale. If a
written bid is the winning bid, a copy should be filed with the
post-sale account.17 The trustee may conduct the sale on cash or
credit terms.179 Before receiving a bid, the trustee can require a
cash deposit from any bidder of up to 10 percent of the purchase
the property to the only bidder, a representative of the creditor, for a grossly inadequate
price and the court held that the sale was prejudicial. Id. at 591, 134 S.E.2d at 554. Mayo
v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 485, 496 (E.D. Va. 2014); Whitlow v. Mountain
Tr. Bank, 215 Va. 149, 152, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1974) (holding trustee is a fiduciary for
both borrower and lender with common-law duty of impartiality).
172. Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 20, 109 S.E.2d 379, 386 (1959).
173. Morriss v. Scruggs, 147 Va. 166, 174, 136 S.E. 655, 657 (1927); Linney, 145 Va. at
593, 134 S.E. at 555.
174. Terry v. Fitzgerald, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 843, 852 (1879).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
176. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 588 (1921); Smith v. Credico Indus. Loan Co.,
234 Va. 514, 516-18, 362 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1987); Whitlow v. Mountain Tr. Bank, 215
Va. 149, 152, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1974); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43, illus. 20 & reporter's note d (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
177. Harrison v. Manson, 95 Va. 593, 599, 29 S.E. 420, 422 (1898).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
179. Id. § 64.2-778(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012). Even if the sale is advertised on cash terms,
it is within the trustees' discretion to actually sell on credit terms. Rogers v. Runyon, 201
Va. 814, 820-21, 113 S.E.2d 679, 683 (1960).
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price."8 Whether to require a deposit is in the trustee's sole dis-
cretion, as long as the deed of trust does not require one.'8' The
deposit will be refunded unless the bid is successful, in which
case it is credited against the sale price.'82 If the winning bidder
fails to complete the purchase, its deposit can be used to pay the
costs and expenses of the sale.' Any remaining balance after the
expenses are paid may be kept by the trustee as compensation.
The trustee may then resell the property.'
The creditor may bid on and purchase the property. Virginia
courts have held that the creditor is not obligated to bid the full
amount of its debt, particularly if the creditor believes the debtor
has sufficient assets to meet any remaining deficit.8 6 The Virginia
Code says that the trustee must not participate in fixing the
lender's bidding price unless the lender "bids the amount secured,
including interest through the date of sale and costs of foreclo-
sure.
, ,87
Since the sale of real property comes under the Statute of
Frauds, a foreclosure sale must be formalized by a memorandum
of sale signed by the purchaser.'
When the trustee receives the sale proceeds, he must account
for them to the commissioner of accounts and apply the proceeds
to pay the expenses and his commission, discharge any taxes that
have priority over the deed of trust, and discharge remaining
debts secured by the property in order of their priority.' If money
remains after these obligations are satisfied, the trustee should
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
181. Yaffe v. Heritage Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 235 Va. 577, 581-83, 369 S.E.2d 404, 406-07
(1988).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Definite Contract Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Tumin, 158 Va. 771, 790, 164 S.E. 562,
568 (1932); In re Cooper, 273 B.R. 297, 303 (Bankr. D.C. 2002).
186. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Fox Run Ltd. P'ship, 255 Va. 356, 364, 497 S.E.2d 747,
752 (1998).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1423(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012). But other kinds of sale to the
lender may not pass title, particularly dubious ones. Heermans v. Montague, 20 S.E. 899,
904 (Va. 1890).
188. Id. § 11-2(6)-(7) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
189. Id. § 55-59.4(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012). The funds must be disbursed in the correct
order as set out in the statute.
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pay that surplus to the borrower-grantor.190 The trustee should
also execute a deed of release for the borrower-grantor if the sale
proceeds satisfied the underlying note.'9'
The trustee is required to make an accounting of the foreclo-
sure sale within six months after the date of sale to the commis-
sioner of accounts for the circuit court where the deed of trust
was first recorded.9 2 The form for this report is prescribed by the
Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia and provided to each circuit court clerk, who in turn provides it
to "every fiduciary who qualifies in the clerk's office."'93 The com-
missioner will review the expenses and commission taken by the
trustee. The commissioner should reduce the amounts taken if
there is evidence that the trustee was incompetent at the time or
that the commission is "excessive in light of the compensation in-
stitutional fiduciaries generally receive in similar situations."'94
The commissioner of accounts reviews the trustee's report and
sends it to the clerk and the court. The judge confirms or rejects
the account after fifteen days. It is recorded with fiduciary re-
ports.
19 5
If the trustee fails to file the accounting with the commissioner,
the commissioner will either proceed against the trustee himself
by having the trustee served with a summons to file the report or
file with the court a list of fiduciaries that did not complete re-
ports within the required time.'9 6 If the trustee fails to respond
within thirty days, the court may assess a fine of up to $500.'" In
addition, if the trustee is a practicing attorney licensed in Virgin-
ia and fails to provide an accounting within thirty days of service
of summons, the commissioner will send a copy of his report to
190. Id.; RAO ET AL., supra note 25, at § 16.4.
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012). If the grantor has died and there is
money that should have been distributed to her, the trustee should instead deliver it to
the deceased grantor's personal representative. Id. § 55-64 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
192. Id. § 64.2-1309(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012). 'The date of sale is the date specified in the
notice of sale, or any postponement hereof." Id.
193. Id. § 64.2-1308 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
194. Id. § 64.2-1208(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
195. Id. § 64.2-1309 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
196. Id. §§ 64.2-1215-1216(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
197. Id. § 64.2-1215(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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the Virginia State Bar.198 Finally, a trustee who fails to report
must forfeit his commissions on the sale.199
The trustee conveys the property to the buyer by a special war-
ranty deed. If the trustee acts as settlement agent at closing, the
trustee must record the deed and other documents within two
business days of settlement."' The trustee may then disburse the
sale proceeds.20 '
In Virginia, if the proceeds from the sale don't satisfy the un-
paid balance of the obligation, the lender may recover a personal
judgment against the borrower for the deficiency.2 2 There are two
ways to calculate the amount of the deficiency judgment.2 03 First,
subtract from the total obligation the larger of the foreclosure
sale price or the property's fair market value. Use of fair market
value prevents windfalls to a lender that purchases at a foreclo-
sure sale by bidding the amount of the debt or another low figure.
Second, subtract the foreclosure price from the borrower's debt.
The Montana Supreme Court used its inherent equitable powers
to require the first measure, that the fair market value of the
foreclosed real estate be the measure in a deficiency judgment
proceeding.0 4 The borrower should scrutinize the lender's calcula-
tion of the deficiency.
Bids at forced foreclosure sales are usually low.20' Courts do not
impose a market-value or fair-market-value standard. They hold
that the foreclosure sale price at a regularly conducted sale is de-
fective only if it is grossly inadequate. The Restatement suggests
198. Id. § 64.2-1216(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
199. Id. § 64.2-1217 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
200. Id. § 55-525.11 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
201. Id. § 55-59.4 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
202. See, e.g., Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Maplewood Invs., 31 F.3d 1276, 1278 (4th Cir.
1994); Nizan v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn. N.A., 274 Va. 481, 485, 650 S.E.2d 497, 499
(2007). See generally RAO ET AL., supra note 25, at §§ 16.3.1-2. A minority of states forbid
deficiency judgments. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West) (Westlaw current
with urgency legislation through Ch. 1 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2d Ex.
Sess.).
203. Alan M. Weinberger, Tools of Ignorance: An Appraisal of Deficiency Judgments, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 885 (2015) (proposing a statutory solution to calculate a defi-
ciency judgment).
204. Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont.-Carpenters-Employers Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria
P'ship, 780 P.2d 608, 617 (Mont. 1989).
205. See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994).
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a price below 20 percent of fair market value as grossly inade-
quate.°6
The Virginia rule is that price inadequacy will only suffice to
set aside the sale if the price is so grossly inadequate as to "shock
the conscience"207 or constitute a sacrifice of the property.2°8 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has also held that the determination
of the foreclosed property's value is not based on fair market val-
ue, but rather on forced sale value.2 °9
If proven, fraud will result in a judgment being set aside, in-
cluding a foreclosure. But the sale of property at foreclosure for
less than market value to the lender, even if the lender is the only
bidder does not, without more, constitute fraud.2 10
Since power-of-sale non-judicial foreclosure doesn't require ju-
dicial confirmation, a debtor assailing the price as inadequate
must, as discussed below, file an independent lawsuit, typically to
set the sale aside.21' If the borrower doesn't vacate the property
after the sale, the buyer may employ unlawful detainer to evict
the holdover.12 Whether the borrower may argue that the sale
was invalid as a defense to eviction is unknown.'
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 8.3 cmt. b (1997); see also RAO ET AL., su-
pra note 25, at § 16.2.3.3. In BFP v. Resolution Tr. Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a foreclosure sale is not a Bankruptcy Code fraudulent conveyance. 511 U.S. at 545. A
public sale with competitive bidding and an appropriate sale price is conclusive of the
property's value. JEFF I. FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY
§ 16.03(B)(1) (3d ed. 2013).
207. Squire v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507, 519, 758 S.E.2d 55, 61 (2014);
Musgrove v. Glasgow, 212 Va. 852, 854, 188 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1972) (finding the sale was free
from attack for inadequacy of price where winning bid represented entire amount of debt,
sale was conducted pursuant to trust deed provisions, and fraud was neither alleged nor
proved); Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755, 756, 82 S.E. 711, 712 (1914).
208. Linney v. Normoyle, 145 Va. 589, 594, 134 S.E. 554, 555 (1926).
209. Cromer v. De Jarnette, 188 Va. 680, 687, 51 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1949).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012).
211. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 627 (7th ed. 2010).
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-124 (Repl. Vol. 2015); see, e.g., Lewis v. Nationstar Mortg.,
LLC, No. 3:13cv00026, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11113, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2014); Wolf
v. Fannie Mae, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4300, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2013); Vazzana v.
Citimortgage, Inc., No. 7:12cv00497, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78541, at *2-3 (W.D. Va. June
4, 2013); Marion Inv. Co. v. Va. Lincoln Furniture Corp., 171 Va. 170, 181, 198 S.E. 508,
513 (1938); RAO ET AL., supra note 25, at § 16.8; DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 5.10(2) (2d ed. 1993).
213. RAO ETAL., supra note 25, at § 5.1.4.6.
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IV. THE BORROWER'S RESPONSES AND DEFENSES
A. Redemption
Generally the borrower may redeem or cure before the sale by
paying the amount due in full. The Virginia Code does not pro-
vide the borrower an automatic right to cure under the statute.14
However, some deeds of trust provide the borrower a period in
which to reinstate the loan by curing the default, paying the defi-
ciency or "bring[ing] the loan current.,215 The Federal National
Mortgage Association-Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
deed-of-trust form, widely used in residential transactions, allows
the borrower to cure default until five days before the foreclosure
sale in a power-of-sale foreclosure.16 The borrower may pay or
tender arrearages before the effective date to cure the default and
save her equity in the property. Arrearages include overdue in-
stallments of principal and interest plus other costs. If the deed of
trust contains such a provision, then the trustee may not initiate
foreclosure proceedings until after the cure period has passed.
B. Asserting a Defense
Because Virginia is a non-judicial-foreclosure jurisdiction, the
borrower must take the initiative to bring the matter before the
court. The borrower may sue the lender seeking to foreclose, al-
leging breach of the statute or the deed of trust.217 The borrower's
defenses include: whether the mortgage is valid; whether she has
defaulted; whether proper procedure has been accorded, including
notice and advertisement; and breach of the trustee's fiduciary
duty.218
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
215. E.g., Deed of Trust, FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/uni
form/pdf/3047.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
216. Mayo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 485, 496 (E.D. Va. 2014) (plaintiffs
claim for breach of contract because of Inadequate notice of borrower's right to cure sur-
vived defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); RAO ET AL., supra note 25,
at § 4.2.5.
217. E.g., Harrison v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:12-cv-00224, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85735, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2012).
218. RAO ETAL., supra note 25, at § 4.3.1-2.
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If appropriate, the borrower may sue the lender either in tort
or contract for wrongful foreclosure and recover damages.219
In 2014, in Squire v. Virginia Housing Development Authority,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the borrower had
breached by failure to pay arrearages and the lender had
breached a condition precedent to foreclosure, the HUD face-to-
face meeting.22 However, the court declined to rescind the foreclo-
sure sale to a buyer it held to be a bona fide purchaser.22' The bor-
rower's allegations of breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and
prayer for damages survived the lender's demurrer and were re-
manded.222 There was a dissent on whether the lender's breach of
HUD's face-to-face meeting is sufficient in the borrower's post-
foreclosure lawsuit, arguing that the borrower hadn't shown that
the lender's breach caused her damages."' Justice Mims' concur-ring opinion is persuasive in support of the majority.224
A federal judge ruled that a borrower's allegation of her lend-
er's fraud and constructive fraud survived the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.22' Borrowers have also argued that their lender's tactics
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Their arguments, with but one exception, have not been success-
ful. The federal courts have reasoned that the implied covenant is
a contract doctrine that does not establish an independent tort;
that a contract party does not breach the implied covenant when
it exercises an express right under the contract; and that the cov-
enant which is located in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code does not apply to land.26 The last point is a narrow view of
219. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 275 Va. 114, 118, 122; 654 S.E.2d 898,
899, 902 (2008); Mayo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 485, 498-99 (E.D. Va.
2014) (holding abuse of process not plausibly alleged); RAO ET AL., supra note 25, at § 16.5.
220. 287 Va. 507, 521, 758 S.E.2d 55, 63 (2014); Parris v. PNC Mortg., 2014 WL
3735531, at *5 (E.D. Va. 2014) (holding that extensive dealings are not an exception to
prerequisite of face-to-face meeting).
221. Id. at 520, 758 S.E.2d at 62.
222. Id. at 521, 758 S.E.2d at 63.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 528, 758 S.E.2d at 67.
225. Matanic v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A, No. 3:12cv472, 2012 LEXIS 134154, at *17-21
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2012).
226. Jones v. Fulton Bank, N.A., No. 3:13-cv-126, 2013 LEXIS 100779, at *22 (E.D. Va.
July 18, 2013); Bagley v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., No. 3:12-cv-617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11880, at *19-20 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2013); Matanic, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134154, at
*20-21; Harrison v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:12-cv-00224, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85735
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the covenant, for the Restatement of Contracts section on the im-
plied duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to "[e]very con-
tract.'27
The exception is Parris v. PNC Mortgage where a federal dis-
trict court held that the borrower-plaintiffs complaint for breach
of contract alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for the credi-
tor's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.28 But, lacking an allegation of an independent ort, the bor-
rower's complaint did not state one for punitive damages.2 '9 The
Parris decision left Virginia with a division of authority on the is-
sue of whether the borrower may utilize breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Non-judicial foreclosure takes place between two private par-
ties. By definition, in a non-judicial foreclosure, there is no judi-
cial forum for the mortgage borrower to interpose defenses. Even
though the borrower may be deprived of her property interest in
her home or farm without a judicial hearing, courts have held
that the state-action prerequisite to due process is absent.2 °
Several techniques are available to the borrower. A declaratory
judgment is the borrower's most common technique. The borrow-
er may couple it with a quiet title claim.231' Borrowers' quiet title
actions have not succeeded when the plaintiff had not paid the
debt and satisfied all her obligations to the lender and therefore
did not have a superior right to the property.232
(E.D. Va. June 20, 2012); Bennett v. Bank of America, N.A_, No. 3:12cv34-HEH, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 54725, at *29-30 (E.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2012).
227. Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (examin-
ing a federal government contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
228. See Parris v. PNC Mortg., No. 2:14cv142, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104278, at *28-
29 (E.D. Va. July 7, 2014).
229. Id.
230. Parks v. Bank of N.Y., 614 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ga. 2005); see generally William E. Eye,
Comment, Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac State Actors? State Action, Due Process, and
Nonjudicial Foreclosure, 65 EMORY L.J. 107 (2015) (examining state action in nonjudicial
foreclosure and concluding that Fannie and Freddie, under FHFA conservatorship, are
state actors).
231. See, e.g., Vazzana v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 7:12cv0047, 2013 LEXIS 78541, at
*14-15 (W.D. Va. June 4, 2013); Squire v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507, 520, 758
S.E.2d 55, 62 (2014). The borrower may file a lis pendens notice with her lawsuit to alert
potential buyers.
232. Lewis v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 3:13cv00026, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11113,
at *16 (W.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2014); Bagley, 2013 LEXIS 11880, at *24-25; Matanic v. Wells
Fargo Bank N.A., No. 3:12cv472, 2012 LEXIS 134154, at *21-22; Squire, 287 Va. at 520,
758 S.E.2d at 62.
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The debtor may also seek equitable relief, an injunction, before
the sale.8 The borrower may file a lawsuit seeking an interlocu-
tory injunction to bar an allegedly improper foreclosure sale.234
Although posting a bond is a prerequisite for an interlocutory in-
junction, an indigent may move to waive the bond or set a re-
duced amount."'
After the sale, the borrower may sue in equity to set a defective
sale aside36 or to recover as damages her equity lost because of
the lender's improper procedure.37
C. Subsequent Owners and "Show Me the Note"
Disputes may arise about whether a subsequent owner of an
instrument is a holder in due course. If not, the subsequent owner
acquires the note or deed of trust subject to the borrower's exist-
ing defenses. This issue came before the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Horvath v. Bank of New York.2" The case arose when
the borrower defaulted on a note secured by a deed of trust on his
home. The note, originally between Horvath and America's
Wholesale Lender, had been transferred to the Bank of New
York.29 The Bank foreclosed after Horvath failed to make pay-
ments.24° Horvath argued that the foreclosure was inappropriate
because only the original lender had the authority to foreclose.4'
The court observed that "parties may contract around the base-
line rules applicable to negotiable instruments.2 2 But the note
233. Rossett v. Fisher, 52 Va. 492, 499, 501 (1854).
234. HomeSide Lending, Inc. v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Antietam Square Condo., 261 Va.
161, 165, 168, 540 S.E.2d 894, 895, 897 (2001) (deciding a motion for TRO to bar sale);
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 38 (1991).
235. At least one practitioner finds that circuit court judges may be reluctant to waive
bond because they think that the bond requirement, "shall," is mandatory under VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-631(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). The judge has discretion to set the amount that the
court "considers proper" and to set "conditions." Judges often limit the required security to
the property itself.
236. See Squire, 287 Va. at 507, 758 S.E.2d at 55; Mayo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F.
Supp. 3d 485, 498 (E.D. Va. 2014) (recognizing borrower's equitable claim to set aside fore-
closure but not deciding it on lender's motion to dismiss); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 211, at 627.
237. Squire, 287 Va. at 515, 758 S.E.2d at 59-60; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v.
Simmons, 275 Va. 114, 119, 654 S.E.2d 898, 900 (2008).
238. 641 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2011).
239. Id. at 619.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 622.
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and deed of trust at issue had not done So.24' The court also point-
ed out that, contrary to Horvath's assertion, transfer of the un-
derlying debt (the note) carries with it the transfer of the accom-
panying securitization by the deed of trust.244 Thus, the mortgage
follows the note.245
In an assignment, the borrower's defenses on the note can be
available if the assignee is not a holder in due course of the note.
The Fourth Circuit addressed one such situation in Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Maplewood Investments. Maplewood executed a
note in favor of Commonwealth Savings Bank of Virginia, F.S.B.
("Commonwealth Bank"), which foreclosed on the property.
2 47
Commonwealth Bank itself purchased the property at 70 percent
of the total indebtedness and filed suit for a deficiency judgment
against Maplewood and its individual guarantors14 1 Common-
wealth Bank was subsequently closed and Resolution Trust Corp.
("RTC") was appointed receiver; RTC replaced Commonwealth
Bank as plaintiff in the deficiency suit.249 Maplewood alleged that
the trustee had conflicts of interest during the foreclosure sale.25°
The district court rejected Maplewood's conflict of interests ar-
gument and granted summary judgment to RTC. 51 Maplewood
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court and found
that a conflict of interest had existed.252 The court held that be-
cause a conflict of interest constitutes bad faith, whether the de-
fense would succeed against RTC depended on its status as a
holder or non-holder in due course.252 After a thorough analysis of
negotiable instrument law, the court concluded that RTC was not
a holder in due course of the note." Thus, Maplewood's defense
against RTC survived the transfer.255
243. See id.
244. See id. at 623.
245. See id.
246. 31 F.3d 1276 (4th Cir. 1994).
247. Id. at 1279.
248. Id. at 1279-80.
249. Id. at 1280.
250. Id. at 1278.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1278-79.
253. See id. at 1278, 1284, 1294.
254. Id. at 1294.
255. Id.
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Following the mortgage crisis in 2008 and the subsequent wave
of foreclosures, debtors across the country invoked a defense
nicknamed "show me the note," with varying degrees of success.256
Simply put, as a defense to foreclosure, the borrower challenges
the secured party to produce documentation or other proof that it
owns the indebtedness, arguing that without proof, the party
cannot properly foreclose.257 This often proves difficult or impossi-
ble for lenders who were not original to the transaction and might
even be the third or fourth owners. Plaintiffs successfully inter-
posed lost-note affidavits.2 8
MERS, a subsidiary of MERSCORP, Inc., is a membership-
based private database company that tracks mortgage transfer
information by assigning a unique eighteen-digit mortgage identi-
fication number ('MIN") to each mortgage loan. MERS is the
lender's nominee without an interest in the note. The deed of
trust may authorize MERS to foreclose.9 In some states, courts
have held that the difficulty in establishing ownership of secured
debt rendered foreclosures or transfers invalid.2" However, in
Virginia, courts have rejected MERS-based attacks on foreclosure
proceedings.
In Ramirez-Alvarez v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, MERS filed
the substitute appointment trustee as nominee.261 The plaintiff
challenged MERS's appointment authority. '62 The court held the
plaintiffs request for relief was untimely, but also that it failed
256. See generally Bradley T. Borden et al., Show Me the Note!, 19 WESTLAW J. BANK &
LENDER LIABILITY 3 (2013) (providing a succinct discussion of different states' treatment of
the defense); AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO
SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES (2011) (providing an analysis of UCC
rules for transferring a note).
257. See Borden et al., supra note 256, at 3.
258. See, e.g., Buzbee v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 84 Va. Cir. 485, 489-90 (2012) (Fairfax Coun-
ty).
259. Tapia v. U.S. Bank, N.A_, 718 F. Supp. 2d 689, 693 (E.D. Va. 2010).
260. See Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Mass. 2012) (giving
prospective affirmation of "show me the note" defense in a non-judicial foreclosure juris-
diction); Gee v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 72 So.3d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (ex-
plaining that a court in a judicial foreclosure jurisdiction held that "party seeking foreclo-
sure must present evidence that it owns and holds the note and mortgage in question in
order to proceed with a foreclosure action") (citation omitted).
261. See Ramirez-Alvarez v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 01:09cv1306, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 132536, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 21, 2010).
262. See id.
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"in light of the security instruments themselves.263 It went on to
explain that "[p]laintiffs legal theory contradicts Virginia's well-
established status as a non-judicial foreclosure state, as well as
the authority vested in a trustee under Virginia law to foreclose
and sell property that is provided as security for a loan.,26 4 Like-
wise, in Ruiz v. Samuel I. White, P.C., the plaintiff argued that
MERS did not have the power to appoint a substitute trustee.265
But the court dismissed the suit, holding that MERS, as nominee
"may act on behalf of the [1]ender as authorized by the deed of
trust.""26 As the Fourth Circuit wrote, "For several centuries, Vir-
ginia has attempted to enhance commerce within the state by en-
suring that negotiable instruments-broadly defined under Vir-
ginia law as 'unconditional promise[s] or order[s] to pay a fixed
amount of money' are freely transferable.267
The Virginia Code states that if the note or other indebtedness
secured by the deed of trust is lost or otherwise unavailable, the
trustee can still foreclose, as long as the secured party provides
an affidavit stating as much to the trustee and the trustee pro-
vides the borrower with notice to that effect.268 Since the mortgage
crisis, Virginia courts have had ample opportunity to address




265. See Ruiz v. Samuel I. White, P.C., et al., No. 1:09cv688, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115455, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2009).
266. Id. at *3-4.
267. Horvath v. Bank of New York, N.A., 641 F.3d 617, 621 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
268. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012). Notice must be sent via certified
mail, return receipt requested, and must advise the borrower of additional rights as pro-
vided in the statute. Mayo v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 30 F. Supp. 3d 485, 497 (E.D. Va.
2014) (finding borrower with notice of lost note not injured by lack of lost note affidavit
from beneficiary to trustee).
269. See, e.g., Fedewa v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 921 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508
(E.D. Va. 2013); Jesse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 882 F. Supp. 2d 877, 879 (E.D. Va.
2012); Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720 (W.D. Va.
2011); see also Buzbee v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 84 Va. Cir. 485, 489-90 (2012) (Fairfax County).
Massachusetts, a title-theory jurisdiction, also follows non-judicial foreclosure through
power of sale. However, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 45, 55 (Mass. 2011), is much stricter in requiring technical foreclo-
sure procedures including production of assignments that show authority to foreclose. The
court invalidated foreclosure sales because the foreclosing banks could not prove that they
held the mortgages at the time of the foreclosure notices and sales. The mortgage holder,
the court held, must either hold the note or prove that it has authority to act on behalf of
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D. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
Originally enacted in 1940 as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 ("SCRA")
prohibits a lender from foreclosing on the property of a borrower-
mortgagor serving on active military duty.27° The SCRA protects
active duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard, and members of the National Guard called to
service for longer than thirty consecutive days.271 The protection
extends to any servicemember who executed a note and deed of
trust prior to his or her active duty term.272 It also extends to "a
surety, guarantor, endorser, accommodation maker, comaker, or
other person who is or may be primarily or secondarily subject to
the obligation or liability. ' 272 The lender may not foreclose until
the expiration of a prescribed period after the mortgagor-
servicemember's active duty ends.274
If a creditor takes action upon a servicemember's obligation
during the prohibited period, the court may stay the action of its
own volition. It must stay the action if the servicemember re-
271quests a stay. In addition, any foreclosure or sale during the pe-
riod is invalid without a waiver signed by the servicemember or a
the note holder, citing Ibanez, in Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1123
(Mass. 2012). The federal district court in Montgomery Cty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F.
Supp. 2d 436, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2012), found that MERS does not comply with the state re-
cording statute. These decisions hinge on each state's statutes and common law. Under
the UCC, the mortgage follows the note. See generally AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES (2011) (providing
an analysis of UCC rules for transferring a note).
270. RAO ETAL., supra note 25, at § 4.11.
271. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3911 (Supp. 2016). The SCRA also applies to United States citizens
serving with the forces of an ally. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3914 (Supp. 2016).
272. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3953(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2016).
273. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3913(a)(4) (Supp. 2016).
274. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3953(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2016). The original protection period ended 90
days after the service member returned from active duty. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act-Amendment, Pub. L. No. 108-189, 117 Stat. 2835 (2003). However, in 2008 the Hous-
ing and Economic Recovery Act temporarily extended the protection to nine months. Hous-
ing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (July 30,
2008). In 2012 the protection was further extended to one year. Honoring America's Veter-
ans and Caring for Camp Lejune Families Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-154, 126 Stat.
1165, 1209 (2012). That provision is set to expire December 31, 2014 unless Congress
chooses to prolong its effectiveness, at which time the protection period would revert to the
original 90 days. Id.
275. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3953(b)(1) (Supp. 2016).
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court order.276 Interest on existing obligations is also capped at 6
percent while the servicemember is on active duty and for one
year afterward.277
A servicemember may waive his or her SCRA rights by execut-
ing a written agreement, separate from the note and deed of
trust, during or after his or her term of service.278
E. Bankruptcy
Filing bankruptcy is a common borrower's response to foreclo-
sure. The federal bankruptcy court offers a belabored borrower a
respite, if not always relief, from a foreclosure.
When a debtor threatened with foreclosure or a foreclosure sale
files for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy
Court's automatic stay prevents the creditor's collection or fore-
closure from going forward unless the creditor obtains relief from
the stay.279 The creditor may not file a lien, foreclose, or conduct a
foreclosure sale.28 ° A creditor's action that violates the automatic
stay is void.28' A creditor's willful violation of the automatic stay
may lead to the borrower's recovery of actual damages in compen-
satory contempt including, if the violation follows notice, punitive
damages.2"2
A mortgage lien is the creditor's property interest that is not
discharged in bankruptcy. Filing a Chapter 7 liquidation bank-
ruptcy will usually result in the borrower losing the property.282
276. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3953(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2016).
277. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3937(a)(1) (Supp. 2016). The servicemember "shall provide to the
creditor written notice and a copy of the military orders calling the servicemember to mili-
tary service and any orders further extending military service, not later than 180 days af-
ter the date of the servicemember's termination or release from military service." 50
U.S.C.S. § 3937(b)(1) (Supp. 2016). Interest above 6 percent is then "forgiven." 50 U.S.C.S.
§ 3937(a)(2) (Supp. 2016).
278. 50 U.S.C.S. § 3918 (Supp. 2016).
279. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). Bankruptcy Rule 4001 addresses the procedure for motions
for relief from stay, and local rules for the Eastern or Western District should also be ex-
amined.
280. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 206, at § 8.02.
281. Id. § 8.07.
282. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012).
283. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 206, at § 17.01.
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The borrower may file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and propose a
plan to pay or reduce the mortgage arrearage.'" Her filing may
lead to modification, a workout of some kind, or a private sale.
Under some circumstances, the bankruptcy court can avoid a lien
on the debtor's exempt property.285 The borrower's Chapter 13
plan may cure her default over a reasonable period, but it may
not modify her residential mortgage.286
The creditor may move for relief from the automatic stay to
proceed with its foreclosure. The bankruptcy court "shall" grant
relief from the stay "if (A) the debtor does not have an equity in
such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effec-
tive reorganization" in Chapter 13.287 It is the creditor's burden to
show that no equity exists.288 A borrower has no equity when the
total amount of liens on the property exceeds its value.289 In Asso-
ciates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, the Supreme Court found that
valuation of collateral in bankruptcy should be based on "re-
placement value.2 ° An amendment o the Bankruptcy Code codi-
fied the Rash decision.2"' Once the creditor has established that
the borrower lacks equity, the burden shifts back to the borrower
to show that the property is necessary to Chapter 13 reorganiza-
tion and that there is a reasonable possibility of a successful reor-
ganization in a reasonable time.292
The bankruptcy court "shall" grant relief from the stay "for
cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest."2 92Adequate protection exists
284. Id.
285. Id. § 12.07.
286. Id. § 18.07.
287. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (2012); FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 206, at § 8.06(B).
288. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1) (2012). All other issues are the burden of the debtor. Id.
§ 362(g)(2) (2012).
289. Nationsbank of Va. v. DCI Publ'g of Alexandria, 160 B.R. 538, 540 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1993). Liens against other property or other potential collateral are irrelevant to the
inquiry. Id. at 540-41.
290. Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 960 (1997). The court defined
replacement value ao "the price a willing buyer in the debtor's trade, business, or situation
would pay to obtain like property from a willing seller." Id.
291. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012); In re Henry, 457 B.R. 402, 407 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011)
("Bankruptcy courts appear to be unanimous in the view that the first sentence of
§ 506(a)(2) codifies Rash in individual chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases by mandating the
use of replacement value as the valuation methodology.').
292. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (2012); see In re Cho, 164 B.R. 730, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
293. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012).
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when the property's value exceeds the secured debt.94 The Bank-
ruptcy Code lists three methods for the debtor to obtain adequate
protection: the debtor's periodic cash payments to offset a de-
crease in the value of the creditor's interest caused by the stay;
additional or replacement liens; and "granting such other relief
.. as will result in the ... indubitable equivalent of such entity's
interest in the property."9 ' If the debtor has sufficient equity in
the secured property and insurance, the creditor will also be ade-
quately protected.96
The bankruptcy court will also grant the creditor relief from
the stay with respect to secured property if it finds "that the filing
of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud
creditors."'297
Whether a creditor's mortgage foreclosure is an avoidable pref-
erence has led to significant disagreement. Some courts, recogniz-
ing that the mortgage creditor stands to receive more from a fore-
closure sale than from the bankruptcy proceedings, have held
that foreclosures taking place within the ninety-day period pre-
ceding the bankruptcy filing can be avoided so long as the credi-
tor fails to overcome the presumption of insolvency.29 s Other deci-
sions have expressed concern about the encroachment of federal
bankruptcy law on state sovereignty and refused to allow debtors
to use preference recapture to avoid mortgage foreclosures."'
The borrower's bankruptcy discharge takes the form of a dis-
charge injunction."' Bankruptcy will discharge the mortgage bor-
294. See FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 206, at § 8.06(B)(1).
295. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012).
296. E.g., In re Ebersole, 440 B.R. 690, 698 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2010); In re Franklin
Equip. Co., 416 B.R. 483, 528 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009). How much equity constitutes ade-
quato protection is loft to thc court to determine on the faeto. But sce In re James River
Assoc., 148 B.R. 790, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) ("Case law has almost uniformly held
that an cquity cushion of 2096 or morc constitutes adcquate protection . . . and that ali eq-
uity cushion under 11% is insufficient to constitute adequate protection") (citations omit-
ted).
297. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) (2012).
298. Glaser v. Chelec, Inc. (In re Glaser), No. 01-10220-SSM, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1816,
at *29 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 25, 2002); Villarreal v. Showalter (In re Villarreal), 413 B.R.
633, 636-37 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
299. Newman v. FIBSA Forwarding, Inc. (In re FIBSA Forwarding, Inc.), 230 B.R. 334,
341 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1999).
300. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012); Doug R. Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: To-
ward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723, 765 (1980); FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note
206, at § 13.09.
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rower's unsecured personal obligation on the note."0' The mort-
gage creditor's in rem security interest in the collateral is a prop-
erty interest that isn't discharged. Even though her personal ob-
ligation is discharged, the mortgage creditor may foreclose on the
borrower's home."2 Although the lender may foreclose the mort-
gage, the borrower's liability for a deficiency judgment has been
discharged. "This is because the bankruptcy discharge does not
extinguish a secured creditor's in rem rights as to the debtor's
property; the discharge only prohibits an in personam claim
against the debtor.""'
Instead of foreclosing, a mortgage creditor may communicate
with the discharged debtor about continuing her payments on the
mortgage."4 Under section 521 in the Bankruptcy Code, the bor-




F. Self-Help and Civil Disobedience
Borrowers' responses to foreclosures to protect their property
have taken the form of self-help and civil disobedience. Shay's
Rebellion in 1787 was in part a response to creditors' foreclosures
of borrowers' mortgages.'°6 The reaction to the rebellion led to re-
placing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution."7
In the Great Depression of the 1930s, farmers blocked foreclo-
sure sales and suppressed potential bids. "[F]riends of the debtor,
using unspoken intimidation to cut off other bids, bought back the
property for a few cents and restored it to its owner."38
301. RAO ET AL., supra note 25, at § 16.3.5.
302. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 206, at § 13.09(B).
303. Lovegrove v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 7:14cv00329, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112768, at *6 (W.D. Va. Aug. 25, 2015).
304. 11 U.S.C. § 524(j) (2012).
305. Id. § 521(a)(2)(A).
306. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 224-25 (2004). GEORGE BROWN TINDAL,
AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 261 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. ed., 1st ed. 1984).
307. Id. at 262-63, 265, 276.
308. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD
ORDER 1919-1933, 460 (1957); see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, 195-96 (1999).
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In the recent mortgage crisis, the Philadelphia sheriff refused
to conduct foreclosure auctions, a tactic that led to a settlement
and some relief for mortgage debtors.9
These debtors were defending their property, which was
threatened by deflation in its value and their income without de-
flation in their debts.1 Political efforts for relief followed in their
wake and governments responded.311
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
After five million foreclosures between 2007 and 2014 in 2016,
although cleanup continues, the foreclosure crisis is winding
down or ending. The foreclosure crisis tested all states' systems.
In 2013, 607,370 foreclosures were completed.312 Many of those
still out of work are discouraged and not seeking employment and
fewer available low-skilled jobs means that unemployment will
clear slowly. In Virginia alone, between January 2013 and Janu-
ary 2014, 11,858 foreclosures were completed.313 The foreclosure
system still has a lot of work to do. Suggestions follow for changes
in Virginia's system that may ameliorate the borrower's plight
without protracting the process.
Judicial Foreclosure. Some observers praise non-judicial fore-
closure states for moving property through the system expedi-
tiously. But others criticize them for lack of protection for borrow-
ers.114 Although a critic of non-judicial foreclosures maintains that
judicial foreclosures are superior,1 ' Virginia, which waited until
2006 to merge law and equity,"' seems unlikely to abandon non-
judicial foreclosure.
Legal Assistance. Taking a family's home or farm is an extreme
exercise of government power. A foreclosure is a complex legal
309. A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is
Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 232 (2009).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. CORELOGIC, supra note 8, at 7.
313. Id. at 8.
314. NELSON ETAL., supra note 34, at 948.
315. Judith Fox, The Future of Foreclosure Law in the Wake of the Great Housing Crisis
of 2007-2014, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 489, 499-506, 520-21 (2015).
316. W. Hamilton Bryson, The Merger of Common-Law and Equity Pleading in Virgin-
ia, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 77, 77 (2006).
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event that most borrowers should not encounter alone without le-
gal assistance. There is a strong case for civil-Gideon lawyers
working for non-represented borrowers through appointment or
on a pro bono basis.
Conciliation-mediation. Lenders should avoid many foreclo-
sures." At the height of the mortgage crisis, many impersonal
mass-production foreclosures were based on questionable and
false affidavits.318 In bureaucratic lending institutions where one
hand may not have known what the other hand was doing, one
branch began foreclosure proceedings while another branch was
negotiating with the borrower. Also, lending institutions, which
are often far away from their collateral, are not good at managing
foreclosed property."9 A mandatory pre-foreclosure settlement
conference or conciliation-mediation process under state law to
supplement the HUD face-to-face meeting before a residential or
family-farm foreclosure. This would bring the borrower face-to-
face with the lender.2 This meeting would allow the parties to
clear up errors and misunderstandings and work out alternatives
to many foreclosures like reinstatement, a modification, a short
sale, or a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Notice to the borrower should
include notice that mediation is available. The state statute
should require the lender to negotiate in good faith about op-
tions.32' The lender's representative should have the power to
make a binding deal. Failing a mediated solution, the mediator
would issue a certificate that the lender's proposed foreclosure
could proceed.22
317. See Fox, supra note 315, at 506-11.
318. See, e.g., id. at 505 (describing a law office in Florida that handled the bulk of gov-
ernment-sponsored entities' state foreclosures by fraudulently reproducing documents and
"robo-signing" affidavits).
319. See Cary Spivak, Lenders Abandoning Foreclosed Properties, MILWAUKEE-
WISCONSIN J. SENTINEL (July 11, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watch dogre-
ports/50548282.html (describing incident where California-based lender left home con-
demned in Milwaukee neighborhood after deciding it did not want to take title and gut the
foreclosed property).
320. See, e.g., Information for Homeowners-Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP),
DC.Gov, http://disb.dc.gov/service/information-homeowners-foreclosure-mediation-progra
m-fmp (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) (noting that the District of Columbia's Foreclosure Media-
tion Program provides homeowners and lenders an opportunity to meet face-to-face).
321. RAO, supra note 25, at § 4.10.3.
322. Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 83 (Iowa 2013) (explaining the statutory
mandatory pre-foreclosure mediation requirement was a jurisdictional prerequisite for a
farm lender suing a borrower to foreclose; but, in the judicial-foreclosure state, the statute
did not apply to a lender's compulsory counterclaim).
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Conciliation-mediation should be scheduled within four weeks
after the lender files. The District of Columbia, which is a non-
judicial foreclosure jurisdiction, has a mediation prerequisite for
foreclosure, so the problem of coordinating mediation and non-
judicial foreclosure should not be insurmountable."'
Virginia could retain non-judicial foreclosure and require the
lender to file a mediation certificate in circuit court before notic-
ing and advertising the foreclosure."4 The burden would then be
on the borrower to file a motion or a lawsuit to stop or enjoin the
foreclosure. The law could give the lender's filing prima facie
momentum so that the foreclosure could move forward. But the
legislation could give the borrower an opportunity to file a motion
to raise defenses and objections instead of filing a separate law-
suit. There would be no judicial review of foreclosure unless the
borrower initiated it. But the judge would be a potential buffer
between the borrower and the lender.
Restructuring. The recent mortgage crisis stemmed from both
irresponsible lending and irresponsible borrowing. One response
that was not taken would have allowed a bankruptcy judge to
modify or write a negative-equity mortgage down to the value of
the property." Although Congress did not give bankruptcy judges
power to restructure mortgage debt by reducing it to the value of
the collateral,326 state legislation could give that power to the cir-
cuit judge on motion by the borrower if the lender refuses.
Notice. Virginia is a non-judicial foreclosure jurisdiction. A Vir-
ginia borrower does not receive a hearing in court and a judicial
decision before facing the foreclosure sale.2 7 The fourteen-day
deadline between the notice and the sale is too short a time for
many borrowers to contest by filing a lawsuit to interpose defens-
es and correct errors. Borrowers who should not have lost their
323. Information for Homeowners-Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP), supra note
320.
324. See Fox, supra note 315, at 513 (describing the success of foreclosure mediation
programs).
325. Abbye Atkinson, Modifying Mortgage Discrimination in Consumer Bankruptcy, 57
ARIz. L. REv. 1041, 1052-53 (2015) (favoring modifications in Chapter 13 bankruptcy);
Dickerson, supra note 309, at 223-24 n.189.
326. See Atkinson, supra note 325, at 1055-56 (discussing concerns with giving bank-
ruptcy judges the ability to change the terms of signed mortgage contracts).
327. Virginia Foreclosure Laws, FORECLOSURE. COM, https://www.foreclosure.com/state
lawVA.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
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homes ended up losing them."' Either thirty or sixty days would
be a reasonable amount of time to mount a defense.
Deficiency judgment. Other states forbid a lender from obtain-
ing a post-foreclosure in personam deficiency judgment to recover
the difference between the debt and the value of the collateral.329
A statutory solution to use "fair value" or a variation based on
Louisiana and South Carolina to calculate the deficiency would
ameliorate borrowers' plight and reduce possible creditors' wind-
falls." °
Until the beginning of 2014, a short sale that forgave some of
the borrower's debt was not income for the borrower.31 When that
provision expired, the IRS became able to tax the borrower on the
foregone debt. 2 If there is no deficiency, there is no cancellation
of debt, and there is no obligation to pay tax.
If the deficiency judgment is retained, consideration should be
given to the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations on a
Virginia deficiency judgment is five years.3 This is too long for
the borrower to wait for the other shoe to drop while the debt
draws interest at the contract rate. The lender can decide within
six months.334
Redemption. Virginia has no post-sale redemption by the bor-
rower to preserve her equity of redemption, if any. Some states
allow a mortgage borrower to redeem the property by paying the
purchaser what it paid at the sale within a set period of time-
328. David S. Hitzenrath, Virginia Puts Homeowners on Fast Track to Foreclosure,
WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305457_pf.html (quoting Jay Speer, Virginia Poverty Law
Center).
329. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West) (Westlaw through urgency legislation
through Chapters 1-41 and 43-59 of 2016 Reg. Sess., ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex. Sess.).
330. Weinberger, supra note 203, at 829, 887 (proposing a statutory solution to calcu-
late a deficiency judgment).
331. Kenneth R. Harney, Senate Action Gives Tax Relief to Short-Sellers This Year; Not
Next, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-
fi-harney-20141228-story.html.
332. Id.
333. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
334. Kimbriell Kelly, Lenders Seek Court Actions Against Homeowners Years After
Foreclosure, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.comlinvestigations
/lenders-seek-court-actions-against-homeowners-years-after-forecloure/2013/06/15/3c6a04
ce-96fc-1le2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_story.html (noting that the states' statutes of limitations
on allowing lenders to pursue deficiency judgments range from thirty days to twenty
years). In Maryland, the statute of limitations is twelve years. Id.
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twenty-eight days, six months, or a year."5 Maryland grants its
judges discretion to allow the former owner to rent the property
back for a short period.336 Allowing a borrower a reasonable time
to cure the default by paying the amount in arrears would help
borrowers in temporary financial trouble, who are later able to
continue making mortgage payments. Virginia should consider
post-sale redemption within a reasonable time.
Comparing foreclosure of a deed of trust to a tax sale lends
some context to the proposed changes. The tax sale notice period
is thirty days.37 The taxpayer has a right to redeem. A tax sale
follows a judicial proceeding and a court order.338 The taxpayer is
entitled to any surplus.9
Another contrast to speedy non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of
trust is the creditor's bill to collect a judgment lien. A creditor's
bill is not used to enforce a deed of trust."° Before a judgment
debtor's real property may be sold to satisfy a judgment lien, the
court must find that renting the property for five years will not
pay the debt.34' A commissioner in chancery conducts a formal ju-




Allowing protections as well as adding-time and possible judi-
cial review to prevent error and to protect the borrower should
improve the foreclosure process for the borrower without undue
prejudice to the lender and return foreclosed property to the mar-
ket untainted by unfairness.
CONCLUSION
Mortgage credit is one of the keystones in the economy. This
article dealt with the issue of what happens when a mortgage
borrower fails to pay. Taking a borrower's home or farm is a seri-
ous exercise of state power that, in Virginia, occurs off the judicial
335. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 628.3 (West) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); see
also NELSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 92.
336. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.6 (West 2016).
337. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
338. Id. §§ 58.1-3960, -3965, -3967 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
339. Id. § 55-59.4(3).
340. Kyger v. Sipe, 89 Va. 507, 511-12, 16 S.E. 627, 628 (1892).
341. Id. at 511, 16 S.E. at 628; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
342. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-462 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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stage. The tradeoffs between allowing a responsible lender to sal-
vage something from a default and protecting the honest borrow-
er's equity, if any, and due process rights are intricate and con-
troversial. This article has summarized Virginia's technical land
financing system from the deed of trust to breach and foreclosure.
It includes the lender's procedure as well as the borrower's pro-
tections. It closes with the author's suggestions that, if adopted,
will ameliorate the borrower's plight, without unduly undermin-
ing the lender's ability to collect a just debt.
